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The wider impacts of energy policy on the macro-economy are increasingly recognised in the 
academic and policy-oriented literatures. Additionally, the interdependence of energy and 
economy implies that a (policy) change in the non-energy system impacts on the energy 
system. However, such spillovers on the energy system have not been extensively researched. 
We begin by analysing the impacts of export promotion policies - a key element of the UKs 
Industrial Strategy - on the energy system and energy policy goals. As the impacts of such 
policies are, in large part, transmitted via their effects on the economy, we adopt a computable 
general equilibrium model - UK-ENVI - that fully captures such interdependence. Our results 
suggest that an across-the-board stimulus to exports increases total energy use significantly. 
This does not come directly through energy exports, but indirectly through the energy sectors 
linkages to other sectors. Export led growth therefore impacts on energy use - and significantly 
so. This in turn is likely to have an adverse impact on emission targets. Policy makers should be 
aware of the fact that a successful implementation of the Industrial Strategy may create 
significant tensions with the UKs Clean Growth Strategy, for example, and with the goals of 
energy policy more generally. The importance of this effect will in practice depend upon: the 
mix of goods and services that are exported (an issue that we shall address once the export 
strategy is published); the success of low-carbon policies. Ultimately, a knowledge of the 
nature and scale of these spillover effects of economic policies on the energy system creates 
the potential for more effective and efficient policy making. 
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The wider impacts of energy policy on the macro-economy are increasingly recognised in the 
academic and policy-oriented literatures. For example, recent contributions to the academic 
literature on energy efficiency policies emphasise the stimulus to economic activity that these 
typically generate. For example, for analyses of energy efficiency in production and 
consumption respectively see Allan et al. (2007), Hanley et al. (2009) and Lecca et al. (2014), 
and for their impacts on distributional issues see Figus et al. (2017). Within policy communities 
there is a developing recognition that the wider impacts of energy efficiency policies should be 
taken into account as proposed in the multiple benefits approach of the International Energy 
Agency (2015), rather than focussing exclusively on energy (and emissions) savings.  
Indeed, some governments emphasise energy efficiency improvements explicitly as economic 
development policies (e.g. the Scottish Government, 2017), as well as a potential source of 
energy savings (e.g. Figus et al, 2018a; Turner et al, 2018). Of course, these developments 
reflect the fundamental interdependence of energy (and emissions) and the economy: policy 
actions in any one system generate spillover effects in the other. Neglect of this 
interdependence may prove problematic for policy.  
The interdependence of the energy systems and the economy naturally also implies that any 
changes in the economy impact on the energy system. The experience of the great recession, 
for example, provides dramatic evidence of such dependence, with total UK energy 
consumption falling by over 6% between 2008 and 2009 when the UK economy contracted by 
around 4% (BEIS, 2017a). However, these spillovers are not necessarily negative, and double 
dividends (or even multiple benefits) are possible, where policies simultaneously stimulate 
economic activity and reduce emissions (and potentially also contribute to other policy goals). 
While this interdependence is, of course, widely recognised, it has not featured prominently in 
assessing the likely impact of economic policies, such as industrial and fiscal policies: rather 
they have tended to focus on the primary economic objectives of these policies, including 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employment. In principle, (non-energy) economic policies 
are likely to have significant influences on the energy system, the neglect of which may lead to 
inefficiencies in the design of appropriate energy and economic policy. The importance of this 
in practice depends on the strength of the interdependencies between both systems and, in 
particular, the scale of the impact of economic (non-energy policies) on energy policy goals.  
It has been suggested that the impacts of economic policies on the energy system have not 
been extensively researched. This perceived lack of systematic analysis is highlighted in a 
recent literature review by Cox et al. (2016). This review found only a small number of research 
papers (49 of the 576 papers considered) that dedicated their analysis to this question, and 
only 25 of these focus specifically on the UK. These papers were divided further into categories 
with the smallest number of dedicated analyses found in communications, culture and sport, 
education, health, industry and international trade. The greatest number of dedicated analyses 
within the UK-focused literature was on planning policy and work policy.  
Cox et al. (2016) however, note that these research papers tend to focus on a single aspect of 
the energy system, such as disposable income spent on fuel and passenger miles travelled, and 
there seems to be a lack of system-wide approaches that link the elements together. The 
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literature review concluded that future research should cover both the relationship between 
non-energy policies and non-energy phenomena. Moreover, the relationship between non-
energy phenomena and energy impacts should be system-based, comparative, and multi-
scalar (Cox et al., 2016). However, in the context of the energy-economy-environment 
modelling literature there has in fact been widespread recognition of the impact of the 
economy and economic policies on energy use, even if the primary emphasis has tended to be 
on the effects of energy and environmental policies. An example is the literature on the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve, which posits that rising prosperity will ultimately be 
accompanied by falling pollution, following an earlier period in which growth is accompanied 
by increasing pollution (see, e.g. Grossman and Kreuger, 1994; Jaffe et al., 2003; Vollebergh et 
al., 2009 and Cui et al., 2017). 
The multi-sectoral computable general equilibrium (CGE) approach which we employ here 
captures the interdependence of the economy and energy systems and allows us to 
automatically track the impact of key energy and economic policy interventions on the main 
goals of both sets of policies and so can be used ultimately to develop a more holistic 
perspective on the conduct of policy.1 In particular, the intention is ultimately to create a 
framework that explicitly recognises, and seeks to quantify, the scale of spillovers from 
economic and energy policies to energy and economic policy goals respectively. Where these 
spillovers prove to be significant, accounting for them through better coordination of 
economic and energy policies would create the potential to deliver improved outcomes for 
both. 
In this paper we analyse the potential impacts of successful UK industrial, business and 
innovation policy on the UK economic and energy systems, as well as the corresponding energy 
policy goals. Two key pillars of the UK Industrial Strategy are concerned with encouraging 
trade and boosting productivity (BEIS, 2017b). In the current paper, we analyse the system-
wide effects of successful export strategies on the economy and energy use.  
Our primary focus here is on the comparatively unexplored impacts of economic policies on 
the energy system and their effects on energy policy goals such as energy use (and emissions), 
energy intensity and energy security. However, the impacts of such policies are, in large part, 
transmitted via their impact on the economic system, so that we have to adopt an approach 
that fully captures such interdependence. While there has been some discussion of the 
economic aspects of the UKs new industrial policy (see e.g. IPPR, 2017, PWC, 2017, and KPMG, 
2017) there has been little analysis of the likely implications for the energy system.  
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the UKs industrial 
strategy, with a particular focus on encouraging trade. Section 3 outlines an ex-ante labour 
market analysis of an export demand stimulus. Sections 4 and 5 outline the structure of our 
energy-economy-environment model of the UK economy, paying particular attention to the 
linkages between the economy and energy components of the model and the simulation 
strategy. We present results in Section 6 and 7, and brief conclusions in Section 8. 
                                                                
1 The use of CGE models to analyse economy-environment interactions is widespread (see Bergman, 2005 for a review). 
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The UK Government has set out an explicit Industrial Strategy aimed at creating an economy 
that boosts productivity and earning power throughout the UK (BEIS, 2017b). The strategy is 
defined as coordinating a wide range of economic policies to achieve particular objectives, 
which need not be purely economic (House of Commons, 2018).  
The industrial strategy identifies five foundations which the government argues are essential 
attributes of every successful economy. These are: ideas (R&D, innovation), people (skills and 
education), infrastructure (broadband, energy, transport), business environment (support for 
specific sectors and SMEs), and places (tackling regional disparities) (BEIS, 2017b). 
Improving these five areas is expected to enable the UK to tackle a series of Grand Challenges. 
These include: clean growth (low carbon technologies across the economy), mobility (low 
carbon transport, automation, and infrastructure), AI and data revolution (how to embed and 
maximise the advantages of AI and data), and aging society (healthcare and labour market 
challenges) (BEIS, 2017b). 
Also, as part of the ambition to be a more Global Britain, encouraging trade is considered a 
critical pillar of the Governments strategy. Although trading more, not less seems to be key, 
precise policies or quantifiable measures are not explicitly stated. Although, a more detailed 
UK Export Strategy is currently being drafted. 
Despite being concerned with coordinating policy, the strategy does not consider explicitly 
trade-offs (or complementarities) across policies, and how such tensions and conflicting 
demands could be overcome. As we illustrate in analytical and empirical analysis, increasing 
trade has a significant impact on the energy system, and energy policy goals in particular. This 
analysis therefore has two objectives; first, to explore how economic (i.e. non-energy) policies 
impact the energy system, and, second, to demonstrate the potential usefulness of the CGE 
modelling approach in capturing and quantifying the interdependencies between the economy 
and energy systems. 
 -
 
In this section we provide some analytical insight into the factors underlying the impact of the 
export demand stimulus that would result from a successful Global Britain UK trade 
promotion policy. We focus on the labour market to highlight the implications of alternative 
perspectives. For simplicity, we assume that the increase in demand is insufficient to generate 
a reaction from the Bank of Englands Monetary Policy Committee, so that no financial 
crowding out occurs.2 
Figure 1 represents the short- and long-run interactions of the general equilibrium labour 
demand and supply curves in the UK labour market. The analysis is comparative static in that 
                                                                
2 In effect we treat the UK as if is operating in a liquidity trap. 
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it can be used to illustrate the impact on the equilibrium real wage and employment, of 
exogenous export disturbances to the UK economy. 
In Figure 1, the demand for labour is a general equilibrium relationship, which incorporates the 
entire system-wide consequences of a change in the real wage. The curve does not necessarily 
have a negative slope in employment-real wage space, because as the real wage falls so too 
does labour income and demand. However, for the default parameter values of our CGE model 
(described in Section 4) the beneficial competitiveness effects of a reduction in the real wage, 
which stimulates exports, dominates the adverse income effects. This is what we would expect 
for a comparatively small (as a proportion of total world trade), open economy like the UK. 
The initial equilibrium is represented in Figure 1 by the intersection of the labour demand and 
supply curves, at point A, generating the initial equilibrium employment and real wage levels 
rw0, and E0. The stimulus to exports shifts the general equilibrium demand curve for labour to 
the right, indicating that more labour is demanded at each real wage. The labour demand curve 
shifts from Do to DSR. In the short run, where sectoral capital stocks are fixed, the rightward 
shift is limited. However, this tends to push up capital rates, spurring sectors to invest in capital, 
and leads to increased capacity and a greater demand for labour in the long run, shifting the 
demand curve from DSR to DLR.   
Of course, the alternative visions of the effective supply of labour, or labour market closures, 
as we outline in more detail in Section 4.3, are crucial to determining the impact of this stimulus 
to demand on wages and employment. These alternatives are reflected in Figure 1. 
Our default model specification embodies a wage curve which reflects an inverse relation 
between the rate of unemployment and the real wage. There is substantial international 
evidence in support for such a model specification. Blanchflower and Oswald (2005), for 
example, provide a review on recent research literature on wage curves found across different 
countries. Empirical evidence for the existence of a wage curve in the UK is given, amongst 
others, by Barth et al. (2002), Bell et al. (2002), Black & FitzRoy (2000), and Collier (2000). In 
the employment-real wage space of Figure 1, the wage curve, or bargained real wage function 
(BRW), is illustrated with an upward sloping curve, reflecting the positive relation between the 
level of employment and workers bargaining power. 
Under our default assumption and benchmark BRW case, workers are able to bargain higher 
wages as the labour market tightens. At the initial equilibrium an excess demand for labour is 
created and the increased bargaining power of workers exerts upward pressure on the real 
wage. This leads to a degree of crowding out through the induced loss in competitiveness. The 
new long-run equilibrium is established at point B, where both and employment and the real 
wage increase to E1 and rw1 respectively. Since economic activity is stimulated, so too is the 
demand for energy used in both production (intermediates) and final demand. 
While, as we have noted, there is compelling international evidence in favour of our default 
wage curve specification, we consider a number of alternative labour market closures, so as to 
reflect alternative visions of how the UK labour market operates. We do this for two main 
reasons. First, there exists genuine uncertainty about the way that the aggregate UK labour 
market currently operates and there has been considerable controversy surrounding the issue 
(e.g. Bell & Blanchflower, 2018). Secondly, we wish to check the extent to which spillovers from 
economic policies to the energy system vary with alternative visions of UK labour market 
behaviour. This allows us, as far as is practical within the UK-ENVI model, to check that our 
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conclusions are robust with respect to the choice of any particular model of the UK labour 
market.  
One alternative vision of the labour market is that it is characterised by excess capacity over a 
range, so that any changes in labour demand can be met by a corresponding change in the 
level of employment, but at a fixed real wage (FRW). Such a case could also be motivated in 
terms of the presence of real wage resistance: workers seek to maintain the real value of their 
take home pay, regardless of the nature of any macroeconomic demand disturbance. In this 
case, the effective labour supply curve is horizontal through point A, and employment adjusts 
in response to labour demand through changes in the unemployment and participation rates. 
Essentially, only quantities change since prices are invariant across long-run equilibria, with the 
new equilibrium at point C in Figure 1, and there is no crowding out of economic activity3. The 
real wage is, of course, unchanged, but employment increases significantly to E2. This 
corresponds to the simple Keynesian multiplier case, and the multi-sectoral results emulate 
the behaviour of an Input-Output system with entirely passive supply side in the long run. Since 
the stimulus to economic activity is greater in this case than for BRW, we expect the use of 
energy to be greater too, both in production and in final demands. 
A further alternative perspective on the labour market, often assumed by national CGE models, 
assumes continuous full-employment (see e.g. Partridge and Rickman (2010) for a brief 
discussion). Here we assume an exogenous labour supply (ELS) curve (and participation rate). 
Employment is effectively fixed, as is reflected in the vertical ELS curve through point A in 
Figure 1. Following the demand stimulus, a new long-run equilibrium is established where the 
real wage rises to rw2: the real wage rises until it dampens the stimulus to demand entirely at 
point D. Of course, there is complete crowding out in terms of employment, which remains 
fixed at E0. In a multi-sectoral context GDP may change as resources are reallocated across 
sectors in response to the demand stimulus and significant upward pressure on real wages, 
but the direction will depend on sectoral export, labour and intermediate intensities and key 
elasticities. However, if GDP increases, it is likely to be a much more modest change than is 
associated with either the BRW or FRW variant. Accordingly, we would expect any stimulus to 
energy use in production and final demands to be less than in the other cases. 
Under present assumptions the fixed nominal wage (FNW) case generates the same results as 
the FRW case in the long run, since prices (and real and nominal wages) do not change. In the 
short run, the stimulus to employment and real wages is less than in the long run. In the FRW 
case, for example, short-run equilibrium is established where FRW intersects the short-run 
general equilibrium labour demand, at point E. In fact, the FNW vision implies an even greater 
short-run stimulus to the real economy since at point E prices have risen, so with a fixed 
nominal wage the real wage must have fallen. The FNW equilibrium lies on the short-run 
demand curve, but at a real wage that lies below that at E, so equilibrium employment will be 
higher (as, for example, at point F). 
 
 
                                                                
3 Input-Output is a general equilibrium system with fixed coefficient technologies, an absence of capacity constraints and an 
infinitely elastic supply of labour. McGregor et al. (1996) demonstrate that regional CGEs generate IO results in long-run 
equilibria given these assumptions. 
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: The system-wide labour market impact of a stimulus to export demands. 
 
 
 
Since, in general, the expansion in the real economy is less in the short-run than in the long-
run, so too will be the stimulus to total energy use. In general, we would expect total energy 
use  in both production and final demand  to increase with the level of economic activity, 
and so the energy impacts will be ranked similarly to the likely employment (and GDP) impacts. 
  
We simulate the economic and energy system impacts of a successful export-promotion 
strategy that generates a significant across-the-board stimulus to UK exports using a 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the UK, UK-ENVI. In practice it seems likely 
that the export strategy that will form a part of the UKs industrial strategy will involve sectoral 
targeting of export promotion and this could have a significant influence on the impact on both 
the economic and energy sub-systems. However, since at the time of writing this strategy had 
not been published we focus here on an across-the-board stimulus. The UK-ENVI model was 
purpose built to capture the interdependence of the energy and non-energy sub-systems. 
Versions of this model have been employed, for example, to analyse the impacts of increased 
efficiency in the industrial use of energy (Allan et al., 2007), identify the impacts of energy 
efficiency programmes on households (Figus et al., 2017), and to identify total energy rebound 
effects of improvements in household energy efficiency (Lecca et al., 2014). 
We adopt the forward-looking variant of the UK-ENVI model, according to which households 
consumption and firms investment are governed by intertemporal optimisation. In the 
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following sections we provide a description of the main characteristics of the model, with a 
particular emphasis on the linkages between the economic and energy sub-sectors.4 
  
We model the consumption decision of five representative households h as follows: 
 ܥ௛,௧ = ܻܰܩ௛,௧ െ ܵܣ ௛ܸ,௧ െ ܪܶܣܺ௛,௧ െ ܥܶܣܺ௛,௧ 
 
(1) 
where total consumption C is a function of income YNG, savings SAV, income taxes HTAX, and 
taxes on consumption CTAX. 
Consumption is modelled to reflect the behaviour of a representative household that 
maximises its discounted intertemporal utility, subject to a lifetime wealth constraint. The 
solution of the household optimisation problem gives the optimal time path for consumption 
of the bundle of goods Ct. To capture information about household energy consumption, 
consumption is allocated within each period and between energy goods and non-energy and 
transport goods and services (including fuel use in personal transportation) as indicated in the 
top level of the consumption structure shown in Figure 2. This choice is made in accordance 
with the following constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function: 
 
ܥ௛,௧ = ቈߜ௛ா൫ܧܥ௛,௧൯ఌ೓ିଵఌ೓ + (1 െ ߜ௛ா)ܶܰܧܥ௛,௧ఌ೓ିଵఌ೓ ቉ି ఌ೓ఌ೓ିଵ 
 
(2) 
ǁŚĞƌĞ ɸ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ĞůĂƐƚŝĐŝƚǇŽĨ ƐƵďƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ĐŽŶƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ ? ĂŶĚ ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƚĞŶƚ ƚŽ ǁŚŝĐŚ
consumers substitute residential energy consumption, EC, for non-energy and transport 
consumption, TNEC, ɷ ੣ (0,1) is the share parameter. For simplicity (and in the absence of 
ďĞƚƚĞƌ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ŝŶ Ăůů ŚŽƵƐĞŚŽůĚƐ ǁĞ ŝŵƉŽƐĞ Ă ǀĂůƵĞ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ĨŽƌ ɸ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ůŽŶŐ-run 
elasticity of substitution between energy and non-energy estimated by Lecca et al. (2014). The 
consumption of residential energy includes electricity, gas and coal, as shown in Figure 2, 
although the share of coal consumed by households represents less than 0.01% of total energy 
consumption. Within the energy bundle, given that we do not focus on inter-fuel substitution 
in the analysis below, we impose a small but positive elasticity. 
 
 
 
                                                                
4 We provide the full mathematical description of the model in Appendix A. 
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: The structure of consumption 
 
 
Moreover, we assume that the individual can consume goods produced both domestically and 
imported, where imports are combined with domestic goods under the Armington assumption 
of imperfect substitution (Armington, 1969): 
 ܳܪ௜,௧ = ߛ௜௙ ή ൤ߜ௜௛௜௥ ή ܳܪܫܴ௜,௧ఘ೔ಲ + ߜ௜௛௠ ή ܳܪܯ௜,௧ఘ೔ಲ  ൨ భഐ೔ಲ        (3) 
 
where QH is total household consumption by sectors, QHIR is consumption of locally produced 
goods, and QHM is consumption of imported goods. With the price of imports being 
exogenous, substitution between imported and domestically produced goods depends on 
variations of national prices. 
It must be noted that the Armington assumption has implications for the decisions of both 
producers and consumers. The choice over imported or domestic inputs for firms depends on 
their relative prices, as well as the Armington elasticity. Similarly, consumers choose over 
imported and domestic goods depending on relative prices and the Armington elasticity. 
Intermediate purchases in each industry are modelled as the demand for a composite 
commodity with fixed (Leontief) coefficients. These are substitutable for imported 
commodities via an Armington link, which is sensitive to relative prices. Given the importance 
of the Armington elasticities to trade we identify the implications of different values of these 
elasticities in our sensitivity analysis. 
  
The production structure of each of the thirty production sectors is characterised by a capital, 
labour, energy and materials (KLEM) nested CES function. As we show in Figure 3, the 
combination of labour and capital forms value added, while energy and materials form 
intermediate inputs. In turn, the combination of intermediates and value added forms total 
output in each sector.  
Following Hayashi (1982), we derive the optimal time path of investment by maximising the 
value of firms, ௧ܸ, subject to a capital accumulation function ܭሶ௧, so that:  
 
Consumption ı=0.64
Residential 
energy
Electricity Gas Coal
Transport and 
non-energy
Transport Non-energy
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ܯܽݔ ௧ܸ෍൬ 1
1 + ݎ൰௧ஶ௧ୀ଴ ൣߨ௧ െ ܫ௧൫1 + ݃(ݔ௧)൯൧ ݏݑܾ݆݁ܿݐ ݐ݋ ܭ௧ሶ = ܫ௧ െ ߜܭ௧ 
 
(4) 
where ߨ௧, is the firms profit, ܫ௧, is private investment, ݃(ݔ௧) is the adjustment cost function 
with ݔ௧ = ܫ௧ ܭ௧Τ  and ߜ is depreciation rate. The solution of the optimisation problem gives us 
the law of motion of the shadow price of capital, ߣ௧, and the adjusted Tobins q time path of 
investment (Hayashi, 1982). 
 
: The structure of production 
 
 
  
As already touched upon in previous sections, we consider a number of alternative labour 
market closures. Our default model specification embodies a wage curve which reflects an 
inverse relation between the rate of unemployment and the real wage. Wages are thereby 
determined within the UK in an imperfectly competitive context, according to the following 
bargained real wage (BRW) specification: 
 
ln ቂ௪௕೟௖௣௜೟ቃ = ߮ െ ߳ ln(ݑ௧)               where ݓܾ௧ = ௪೟ଵାఛത೟  (5) 
 
In equation 5, wt/cpit is the real take home wage, ߮ is a parameter calibrated to the steady 
state, ߳ is the elasticity of wage related to the level of unemployment ݑ௧, and ߬ҧ௧ is the income 
tax rate. So here the real consumption (after tax) wage is negatively related to the rate of 
unemployment (Blanchflower & Oswald, 2005), which is an indicator of workers bargaining 
power. 
The working population is assumed to be fixed and exogenous. This model implies the presence 
of involuntary unemployment (with BRW lying above the competitive supply curve for labour).  
Conventional CGEs of national economies often make the simplifying assumption of an entirely 
exogenous labour supply (with both population and the participation rate invariant): that is 
Total output ı=0.3
Value added
Capital Labour
Intermediate
Energy Material
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labour supply exhibits a zero elasticity with respect to the real wage. This exogenous labour 
supply (ELS) vision of the market implies that employment is fixed. 
 ܮ௦ = ܮ௦ഥ            (6) 
 
Of course, this vision of the labour market implies that the UK operates under a very tight 
supply constraint. Note that, in the short run, both capital and labour are fixed in each sector 
in this case, and so too is value-added. Aggregate GDP can only vary in response to disturbances 
that alter the allocation of activity across sectors. Furthermore, employment is effectively fixed 
even in the longer-term, and is, of course, invariant to any change in demand, although capital 
stocks can adjust in response to changes in rental rates.5  
Some take the view that workers in the UK bargain to maintain their real wage - real wage 
resistance - that results in a fixed real wage (FRW) model (at least in the absence of 
productivity growth). This model implies: 
 ௪೟௖௣௜೟ = ௪೟సబ௖௣௜೟సబ           (7) 
 
This case effectively implies an infinitely elastic supply of labour over the relevant range. In 
stark contrast to the ELS case, here the real wage is fixed, and any demand disturbances will 
be reflected only in employment changes (over a range).  
The ELS and FRW cases represent limiting cases of the responsiveness of the effective supply 
of labour to the real consumption wage, with elasticities of zero and infinity respectively. The 
BRW case represents an intermediate case in which the effective (bargaining-determined) level 
of employment varies positively with the real consumption wage. 
While these cases provide a useful range of alternative visions of the UK labour market, recent 
experience casts some doubt on the current relevance of the BRW or FRW hypotheses, since 
real wages have been falling despite a fall in the unemployment rate. There is clearly some 
evidence of a degree of nominal wage inflexibility. Here we illustrate the likely implications of 
this by exploring the limiting case of a fixed nominal wage (FNW): 
 ݓ௧ = ݓ௧ୀ଴           (8)
  
                                                                
5 In the longer-term population and labour supply can, of course, increase through natural population growth. For simplicity 
we abstraction from that here. Migration flows could also alter labour supply, but we assume that net migration is zero here. 
However, the fixed real wage model, discussed below, emulates many of the features of a system with endogenous (flow) 
migration. 
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The Government in UK-ENVI collects taxes and spends the revenue on a range of economic 
activities. For most of the analysis of the present paper we do not close the government budget 
constraint. Given that we are dealing with an export-led expansion in economic activity we 
expect there to be an increase in tax revenues and an associated contraction in the public 
sector deficit. Maintenance of a given deficit would imply either an expansion in government 
spending or a reduction in tax rates. However, in a forthcoming analysis we shall systematically 
investigate the energy-system impacts of fiscal policy changes. Here we isolate the energy 
impact of the export stimulus, in part to avoid conflating these effects with the consequences 
of an induced fiscal expansion. 
However, we do briefly illustrate the consequences of this assumption, and impose a public 
sector budget constraint as an element of our sensitivity analysis. We constrain the 
Government to maintain a constant budget balance. If the aggregate fiscal deficit is taken to 
be fixed, any changes are constrained to be balanced-budget in nature. The given fiscal deficit 
is maintained by either adjusting taxation or expenditure as: 
  ܩܱܸܤܣܮ் = ܩ ௧ܻ െ ܩܧܺ ்ܲ  
                                                      where 
 
(9) ܩ ௧ܻ = ݀௚ܭ ௧ܻ + ܫܤ ௧ܶ + ߬ҧ௧ ή ܮ ௧ܻ + ܨܧതതതത௧  
 
where GOVBAL is the government budget which is equal to the difference between 
government income GY, and government spending GEXP. GY is given by the share ݀௚ of capital 
income KY that is transferred to the Government, Indirect business taxes, IBT, revenues from 
labour income LY ĂƚƚŚĞƌĂƚĞʏ6, and foreign remittance FE.  
In the base year GOVBAL is negative, indicating a fiscal deficit that we assume to be passive in 
most of our present analysis. However, in our sensitivity analysis we illustrate the 
consequences of a binding public sector budget. In that analysis we assume that the 
Government absorbs the budgetary impacts of any change in the economy by adjusting 
expenditure and keeping household income tax rates fixed.7  
                                                                
6 EŽƚĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝŶĐŽŵĞƚĂǆƌĂƚĞʏŝƐĨŝǆĞĚďǇĚĞĨĂƵůƚ ? 
7 We do not explore the consequences of varying tax rates here since this generates complex supply-side responses. We 
shall explore this in a subsequent analysis. 
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To calibrate the model we follow a common procedure for dynamic CGE models which is to 
assume that the economy is initially in steady state equilibrium (Adams & Higgs, 1990). We 
calibrate the model using information from the UK Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for 2010.8  
The UK-ENVI model has 30 separate production sectors, including 6 main energy supply 
industries that encompass the supply of coal, refined oil, gas and electricity9. We also identify 
the transactions of UK households (by income quintile), the UK Government, imports, exports 
and transfers to and from the rest of the World (ROW). 
The SAM constitutes the core dataset of the UK-ENVI model. However other parameter values 
are required to inform the model. These often specify technical or behavioural relationships, 
such as production and consumption function substitution and share parameters. Such 
parameters are either exogenously imposed, based on econometric estimation where 
available, or determined through the calibration process. 
  
The main focus of this paper is empirically to identify the currently unexplored impacts of 
economic policies on the energy system. Specifically, the present paper investigates the impact 
of successfully encouraging trade in line with the UKs Industrial Strategy (BEIS, 2017b), which 
we assume to be reflected in a significant stimulus to exports. We proceed by exploring the 
system-wide economic effects of this stimulus to exports, focussing particularly on impacts on 
the energy system. 
We shall, in due course, explore the transmission mechanisms of trade-enhancing policy 
instruments that are targeted on individual sectors, and assess their efficacy explicitly. 
However, the Industrial Strategy currently does not provide detail on such targeting or on how 
it plans to measure the success of these policies in terms of scale of impacts, time-frames, or 
the precise policy instruments used.  
Accordingly, for now we proxy the impact of a successful trade-enhancing policies by an 
exogenous (and costless) 5% increase in international export demands across all sectors. 
The economy is taken to be in long-run equilibrium prior to the increase in exports, so that 
when the model is run forward in the absence of any disturbance it simply replicates the base 
year dataset (the 2010 SAM) in each period. The results presented here are typically 
percentage changes in the endogenous variables relative to this unchanging equilibrium 
(unless otherwise specified). All of the effects reported are therefore directly attributable to 
the exogenous shocks to exports. Given that the CGE model uses annual data, we take each 
period in the adjustment process to be one year.  
                                                                
8 The SAM is produced by the Fraser of Allander Institute and available for download at: 
http://www.strath.ac.uk/business/economics/fraserofallanderinstitute/research/economicmodelling/ 
9 See Appendix B for the full list of sectors in the aggregate 30 sector 2010 UK SAM. 
17 
 
To observe the adjustment of all the economic variables through time, simulations are run for 
50 periods (years). Results for a range of economic and energy use are reported. While we 
report selected period-by-period results, the focus is primarily on two conceptual time periods. 
The first is the short run (SR), which is the period immediately after the introduction of the 
exogenous shock. Capital stocks are fixed in the SR at industry level. In the long run (LR) capital 
stocks fully adjust, across all sectors, to the shock, and are again equal to their desired levels. 
However, we also report period-by-period values for a sample of key variables. 
  
We start by discussing the aggregate long-run results for the FNW-FRW closures since this is a 
useful benchmark, whose properties are well-known (as discussed in our general equilibrium 
analysis in Section 3). We then discuss the main differences between the FNW-FRW, BRW (our 
default model), and ELS closures. This is followed by a detailed discussion of the potential 
impacts on the energy-systems, sectoral results, and a discussion of short-run results.  
The short- and long-run macroeconomic simulation results for a 5% increase in international 
exports, reported in percentage changes from base year, across the different labour market 
closures, are summarised in Table 1.  
The adjustments seen in the long-run for the FRW-FNW closures are akin to the results found 
in IO modelling. With no supply restrictions applying, prices remain unchanged in the long run 
(McGregor et al., 1996). The long-run results for the FRW and the FNW closures are the same 
as they both tie down wages in the long-run with no changes in prices.  
As there are no changes in prices (CPI remains unchanged from base), there is no crowding out 
of exports in the long run so that exports increase by the full 5%. The increase in exports 
stimulates aggregate demand, which increases consumption, investment, and GDP, by 1.46%, 
2.35% and 2.08% respectively. Capital stocks rise in the long run by 2.35%, with net investment 
driven by the gap between the capital rental rate and the user cost of capital that opens in the 
short run.  
The stimulus to investment and enhanced capacity reinforces the expansion (and the impact 
on employment). This expansion stimulates the demand for labour so that employment rises 
by 1.91%, and the unemployment rate falls by 1.8 percentage points. Labour income and 
capital income both rise, by 1.91% and 2.35%, respectively. Export industries tend to be more 
capital intensive than the aggregate economy, so that the demand for capital increases slightly 
more than that for labour (this is shown in Appendix B in the final column).  
The public sector deficit falls by 7.3% in the long run, a fall from £98bn to £91bn, as tax 
revenues rise in response to the stimulus to economic activity. We investigate the 
consequences of closing the Government budget constraint in the sensitivity analysis of 
Section 7. 
Imports increase by 2.12% along with increases in domestic demand (we discuss this in more 
detail when considering sectoral results). In the base period net exports are negative i.e. the 
UK economy imports more than it exports. The stimulus to exports thereby decreases the 
negative trade balance by 0.19%. 
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When considering the BRW case, as we would expect from our discussion in Section 3, the 
stimulus to the real economy is significantly less (as compared to FRW/FNW) because real 
wages and prices rise in response to the excess demand for labour. So GDP in the BRW case 
increases by 0.95%, which is less than half of the 2.08% stimulus under FRW/FNW. The rise in 
the real and nominal wage pushes up the CPI (by 0.75%), reducing competitiveness and 
crowding out some of the stimulus to exports, which now rise by only 3.63% in the long run. 
The rise in consumption of 1.16% is less than under FRW (1.46%), but the decline is mitigated 
by the fact labour income actually rises more in this case, with the higher real wage more than 
offsetting the lower employment impact (0.75% as against 1.91%). 
Next we consider the ELS case of continuous full-employment, where we assume an exogenous 
labour supply curve (and participation rate). As we know, following the demand stimulus the 
real wage rises so as to choke off any excess demand for labour at the original level of 
employment. So employment is unchanged, but the real wage and the CPI rise by 1.43% and 
1.24%, significantly more than under the BRW (0.86% and 0.75%). This results in much greater 
crowding out of exports, which now only rise by 2.75%, and a much bigger stimulus to imports 
(of 3.19%). The sectoral distribution of effects does result in a modest stimulus to GDP of 
0.23%, but this is significantly less than under the BRW and FRW-FNW closures.  
Again, as we would expect from our theoretical analysis that the short-run impacts are muted 
given that the capital stock is fixed in the short run both in total and in its distribution across 
sectors, and prices increase in all cases so that there is some induced loss in competitiveness, 
and exports are always crowded out to a degree. As anticipated, the GDP (and employment) 
effects in the short run are ranked as: FNW>FRW>BRW>ELS (and indeed the impact is zero in 
this case). 
These are the kind of economic impacts that are typically associated with export led growth 
strategies. In general, under our default BRW model, a stimulus to exports will benefit the host 
economy in terms of an increase in GDP, employment, consumption and investment. Indeed 
across all models of the labour market we find that key economic indicators are beneficially 
impacted by successful export promotion strategies. Furthermore, the public sector deficit is 
typically reduced, so that government expenditure could be expanded. With both consumption 
and the provision of public services enhanced, it would be reasonable to suggest aggregate 
welfare is enhanced. 
These results therefore appear reassuring for the conduct of UK industrial strategy in that key 
economic indicators move in the desired direction as a consequence of a successful export 
promotion strategy. However, there are substantial and currently unexplored impacts on the 
energy-system, which we now discuss. We focus on the BRW case, our preferred model. 
Total energy use (intermediate plus final demand) increases significantly, by 1.71%. Electricity 
use increases by 1.26% and Gas use by 1.35%. This reflects increases in energy use in both 
production and final demand, notably consumption. Energy use in production (total 
intermediate) increases by 1.41% in the long run in the BRW case. This is driven by the increase 
in intermediate demands from exporting sectors (we explore this in more detail when 
considering sectoral results), and their linkages to the energy sectors. 
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: Short and Long-run effects of a 5% increase in international exports. In % changes from 
base year. 
 
  Long-run   Short-run 
  FRW-FNW BRW ELS   FNW FRW BRW ELS 
GDP 2.08 0.95 0.23   0.64 0.30 0.19 - 
CPI - 0.75 1.24   0.92 1.09 1.24 1.40 
                  
Unemployment rate (pp difference) -1.80 -0.71 -   -0.98 -0.46 -0.29 - 
Total employment 1.91 0.75 -   1.04 0.49 0.31 - 
Nominal gross wage - 1.61 2.68   - 1.09 1.58 2.28 
Real gross wage - 0.86 1.43   -0.91 - 0.34 0.87 
                  
Households wealth 1.36 1.06 0.87   0.43 0.50 0.55 0.61 
Households consumption 1.46 1.16 0.96   0.70 0.56 0.75 0.83 
Labour income 1.91 2.38 2.69   1.04 1.58 1.90 2.28 
Capital income 2.35 1.99 1.76   3.84 2.97 2.83 2.43 
                  
Government budget -7.03 -2.42 0.59   -1.00 0.22 0.76 1.55 
Investment 2.35 1.28 0.59   3.35 2.46 2.01 1.36 
                  
Total energy use (intermediate+final) 2.53 1.72 1.21   1.30 1.04 1.03 0.93 
  - Electricity 2.03 1.26 0.77   1.16 0.83 0.81 0.68 
  - Gas 1.98 1.35 0.94   0.81 0.63 0.70 0.68 
Energy use in production (total intermediate) 2.36 1.41 0.80   0.79 0.55 0.52 0.42 
Energy consumption (total final demand) 2.91 2.44 2.15   1.56 1.49 1.59 1.64 
  - Households 1.43 1.30 1.21   0.75 0.68 0.92 1.05 
  - Investment 2.27 1.26 0.60   2.24 1.55 1.40 1.05 
  - Exports 5.00 4.11 3.53   2.66 2.63 2.55 2.49 
Energy output prices - 0.50 0.82   0.92 0.98 1.06 1.13 
Energy output 2.62 1.65 1.02   0.65 0.48 0.47 0.40 
Non energy output 2.14 1.13 0.48   0.90 0.58 0.48 0.31 
Energy intensity (Total energy use/GDP) 0.44 0.76 0.98   0.66 0.74 0.84 - 
                  
Total imports 2.12 2.77 3.19   3.07 3.06 3.28 3.41 
Total exports 5.00 3.63 2.75   3.00 2.73 2.49 2.25 
Net exports (exports-imports) -0.19 -0.04 0.06   0.04 0.05 0.09 0.12 
  - Electricity 2.18 2.27 2.33   2.42 2.25 2.41 2.45 
  - Gas 2.29 2.46 2.58   2.68 2.53 2.70 2.77 
 
: Short- and long-run are two conceptual time periods. The short run (SR) is the period immediately after the introduction of the 
exogenous shock. Capital stocks are fixed in the SR at industry level. In the long run (LR) capital stocks fully adjust, across all sectors, to the 
shock, and are again equal to their desired levels. The short-run applies to a period of a year; the adjustment period to the long-run varies but 
is typically complete within 7-12 years. 
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The use of energy in consumption (total final demand) sees a significant increase of 2.44%. This 
increase is mainly driven by the stimulus to exports. Although household and investment 
demands for energy increase by 1.30% and 1.26%, this constitutes a marginal contribution to 
total final demands in absolute terms. Energy consumption is thereby driven here mainly 
through exports. 
Energy use increases across the board in response to the export stimulus. Furthermore, energy 
use increases significantly relative to GDP, employment and investment. Energy intensity, 
defined here as energy use per unit of GDP, increases. In fact, this is true across all labour 
market models: energy intensity increases significantly as a consequence of a successful export 
promotion strategy. It appears that exports are thereby rather energy intensive, a 
characteristic we discuss in more detail when considering sectoral results. This is a potentially 
important spillover from a successful UK industrial strategy to the energy system.   
In the base period net exports of Electricity and Gas are negative, dominated strongly by 
imports. The stimulus to exports however does not decrease this negative trade balance. This 
is because exports are small relative to imports so that the corresponding stimulus to imports 
outweighs the increase in exports. 
Energy output prices increase by 0.5% reflecting the stimulus to energy demand created by 
the expansion, as well the increase in labour and material costs. This in turn impacts household 
consumption, for example. 
Figures 4 and 5 summarise selected long-run results at the individual sector level for the 5% 
increase in international exports, for the BRW closure, and Appendix C gives a more detailed 
set of sectoral results. Recall that all sectors receive the same percentage export demand 
stimulus, but sectoral impacts vary because of their different sectoral characteristics, including 
export and energy intensities. Appendix B gives a summary of key sectoral characteristics and 
a full description of abbreviated sector names, which we refer to henceforth.  
The energy sectors are: sector 2, Mining & quarrying (MIN); sector 3, Crude Petroleum & 
Natural Gas & Metal Ores & coal (CRU); sector 4, Other Mining & mining services (OMI); sector 
16, Electricity, transmission & distribution (ELE), and sector 17 Gas; distribution of gaseous 
fuels through mains; steam & air conditioning supply (GAS).  
Energy output prices increase by 0.5% reflecting the stimulus to energy demand created by 
the expansion, as well the increase in labour and material costs. This in turn impacts household 
consumption, for example. 
Figures 4 and 5 summarise selected long-run results at the individual sector level for the 5% 
increase in international exports, for the BRW closure, and Appendix C gives a more detailed 
set of sectoral results. Recall that all sectors receive the same percentage export demand 
stimulus, but sectoral impacts vary because of their different sectoral characteristics, including 
export and energy intensities. Appendix B gives a summary of key sectoral characteristics and 
a full description of abbreviated sector names, which we refer to henceforth.  
The energy sectors are: sector 2, Mining & quarrying (MIN); sector 3, Crude Petroleum & 
Natural Gas & Metal Ores & coal (CRU); sector 4, Other Mining & mining services (OMI); sector 
16, Electricity, transmission & distribution (ELE), and sector 17 Gas; distribution of gaseous 
fuels through mains; steam & air conditioning supply (GAS).  
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Consider first the impacts on sector 28, Education health and defence (EDU). This sector mainly 
serves the domestic market (as detailed in Appendix B) so that it does not benefit directly from 
the export stimulus. Moreover, this sector is also labour intensive so it is particularly impacted 
by the increase in wages with sectoral employment actually falling in the long run by 0.02%. 
This sector therefore experiences a comparatively small stimulus to output of 0.10%. This 
sector, however, accounts for a large proportion of total imports so that the 0.22% increase in 
imports in that sector accounts for 17% of total imports. 
The Construction sector (CON), sector 20, receives around 52% of total incomes from spending 
on investment goods. This is by far the largest capital share of output across all sectors. This 
sector therefore experiences a strong stimulus through its domestic demand linkages. The MIN 
sector experiences a sharp increase in imports. This increase in imports, however, accounts for 
below one percent of total imports in absolute terms.   
Energy intensive sectors (besides the energy supply sectors themselves), such as sector 10, 
Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals (CHE), sector 27, Services (SER), and sector 21, Wholesale & 
Retail Trade (WHO), also exhibit strong export linkages. These sectors consume a significant 
proportion of total energy, and also contribute a significant proportion to total exports. These 
sectors therefore contribute to the energy intensity of exports (in addition to the exports of 
the energy supply sectors). The WHO and SER sectors also contribute large shares to total 
imports with 7% and 13% respectively. 
The direct impact of the export stimulus on the ELE & GAS sectors is relatively muted given 
that they mainly serve the domestic market. They contribute below 1% of total exports and 
around 5% of total imports. However, they do have strong domestic demand linkages to other 
sectors (as noted above) and so respond to their expansion. The corresponding impact on 
employment, however, is relatively small given that these sectors are not labour intensive.  
It is important to note that energy use in production increases more than output, and much 
more than employment in each sector. This could be due in part to a relative price effect, 
where real wages are rising significantly but energy prices less so.  
From these results it is evident that aggregate energy impacts are driven by key characteristics 
of individual sectors. Although all sectors receive the same percentage export demand shock, 
sectoral impacts vary significantly because of their heterogeneous nature. Sectors differ in 
terms of, for example, energy intensity, export intensity and domestic demand linkages and 
these seem to be driving aggregate impacts on energy. This highlights potential policy trade-
offs, particularly at the individual sector level. Increasing exports may generate inadvertent, 
negative impacts on energy policy goals, if the impacted sectors are also energy intensive. 
Given that real wages (and capital incomes) are rising, Households experience rising incomes 
and wealth and so their total consumption - of energy and non-energy goods & services  
increases, as we have already noted. Figure 6 summarises the long-run impacts on households 
consumption, income, the share of income spent on Electricity & Gas, and non-energy goods 
& services, across household quintiles, where HH1 is the lowest income quintile. The share of 
income spent on energy- and non-energy goods and services increases across all Household 
quintile groups.  
Although we do not attempt to investigate the impacts on precise measures of fuel poverty (or 
poverty in general) we can identify the impact on the share of disposable income spent on 
energy (defined as the energy sectors share in each household quintiles consumption). For this 
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we focus on the lowest household income quintile, where fuel poverty/poverty is highest (BEIS, 
2017c). The proportion of the lowest household income groups spending on energy increases 
so on that basis our measure of fuel poverty deteriorates, although on the other hand that 
groups total income and total expenditure on all goods also increase. It could be considered 
as an undesirable outcome for fuel poverty when considering that the lowest household 
income quintile is now paying higher prices for its Electricity & Gas. However, it could be argued 
that this may not be problematic given that household incomes and consumption are 
increasing.  
The other goals of energy policy are similarly adversely affected: affordability (as indicated by 
the price of energy) declines, although real incomes are actually increasing by more than 
energy prices so that there is a sense in which real affordability is improved. 
The time path adjustments for GDP, employment, and total energy use are detailed in Figure 
7. This figure shows how these variables increase throughout all of the simulation periods. 
Moreover, these results highlight that total energy use increases more than proportionately to 
GDP, so that there is a significant negative spillover effect from successful export promotion 
policies to the energy system. There is a potential conflict between economic policies that aim 
to increase exports, and energy policy goals that aim to reduce emissions. Furthermore, as 
noted earlier, these spillover effects, which appear to be substantial across all treatments of 
the labour market, are typically absent from current debates about the effectiveness of 
economic policies. 
It is important to note that the potential impact of export promotion on emissions identified 
here need not in fact materialise. First, if export promotion is focussed on goods and services 
associated with comparatively low emissions, the rise in energy use and emissions would be 
mitigated. Second, if the clean growth strategy results in further decarbonisation of the energy 
sector, increased exports could occur without a corresponding increase in emissions. However, 
our simulations here isolate the effects that are solely attributable to an across-the-board 
export stimulus and the results suggest that it is very likely that this would be associated with 
higher carbon emissions than would otherwise be the case. In order to avoid an actual increase 
in emissions some other policy would require to be implemented (e.g. low carbon export 
promotion; improvements in energy efficiency; further decarbonisation of the energy system). 
Aspects of the UK Governments industrial and green growth strategies are presumably 
intended to combine in this complementary manner, but a knowledge of the existence and 
scale of spillovers of such policy combinations is likely to facilitate an appropriately coordinated 
response. 
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: Long-run effects on output, employment, and energy use by individual sectors of a 
5% increase in international exports, BRW closure. In % changes from base year. 
 
 
 
 
: Long-run effects on output price, imports and exports at individual sectors of a 5% 
increase in international exports, BRW closure. In % changes from base year. 
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Long-run effects on Household quintiles of a 5% increase in international exports, 
BRW closure. In % changes from base year. 
 
 
 
 
Aggregate transition path for GDP, employment, and total energy use of a 5% increase 
in international exports. In % changes from base year.  
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Our central results presented in the previous section depend upon the structural data 
embedded in the base-year values of the UK SAM. However, they are also sensitive to the 
choice of key parameter values in the UK-ENVI model, and the recycling of additional 
government revenues generated by the export stimulus, for example. The values of the 
Armington trade elasticities are particularly important in the case of an export driven demand 
shock as they alter the sensitivity of trade to price changes. 
Here we explore the sensitivity of results to: the degree of the openness of the UK economy 
(by varying Armington trade elasticities for imports and exports); and the imposition of a public 
sector budget constraint. 
Table 2 summarises the results for the sensitivity analysis for the Armington trade elasticities 
for imports and exports for the BRW closure.  Appendix D details the full set of results. This 
elasticity is varied from 1.5, 2.0, and 2.5, where 2.0 is the central elasticity value used in the 
model. We only report the results for the BRW closure here as the basic mechanism outlined 
below also holds for the alternative labour market closures.  
 
: Sensitivity analysis for Armington trade elasticities. Short and Long-run effects of a 5% 
increase in international exports, BRW closure. In % changes from base year. 
 
  Long-run   Short-run 
  ʍс ? ? ? ʍс ? ʍс ? ? ?  ʍс ? ? ? ʍс ? ʍс ? ? ? 
GDP 1.01 0.95 0.90   0.21 0.19 0.17 
CPI 0.80 0.75 0.70   1.35 1.24 1.15 
                
Total employment 0.80 0.75 0.71   0.34 0.31 0.29 
Real gross wage 0.92 0.86 0.81   0.37 0.34 0.31 
                
Total energy use (intermediate+final) 1.79 1.72 1.66   1.06 1.03 1.00 
Energy intensity (Total energy use/GDP) 0.77 0.76 0.75   0.85 0.84 0.82 
                
Total imports 2.66 2.77 2.86   3.06 3.28 3.45 
Total exports 3.54 3.63 3.71   2.29 2.49 2.66 
 
Essentially, as the degree of substitutability is increased from 1.5 to 2.5 the system becomes 
more sensitive to competitiveness changes. To recall, the demands for UK goods are sensitive 
to regional prices relative to the (assumed) constant prices for the ROW. Imports also exhibit 
this relative-price sensitivity. 
The higher the trade elasticity the greater the sensitivity of trade to relative price changes so 
that adverse competitiveness effects are enhanced. With less domestic demand for domestic 
goods there is a smaller stimulus to consumption, output, and the demand for labour. As the 
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Armington elasticity is increased there are more imports and the domestic market experiences 
a smaller stimulus. In the labour market there is less upward pressure on wages.  
The impacts of such changes to the openness of the UK economy on the energy-system (and 
energy policy goals) seem to be stark. Focusing on the long run it can be seen that whilst the 
impact on GDP decreases as the Armington elasticity is increased, total energy use increases 
(mainly through increases in final demands): energy intensity falls. Overall, changes to the 
Armingon trade elasticities illustrate that the degree of substitutability between domestic 
produced goods and imported goods has a significant impact on aggregate results.  
Table 3 details a summary of the results for the sensitivity analysis conducted around the public 
sector constraint for the BRW closure. Appendix E details the full set of results  across all four 
labour market closures. Here we illustrate the consequences of a binding public sector budget 
where we assume that the Government absorbs the budgetary impacts of any change in the 
economy by adjusting expenditure and keeping household income tax rates fixed. This is 
denoted as GOVBALfx in Table 3. GEXPfx corresponds to results outlined previously in Table 1 
where Government consumption is fixed. 
 
: Sensitivity analysis on public sector budget constraint. Short and Long-run effects of a 
5% increase in international exports, BRW closure. In % changes from base year. 
 
 Long-run  Short-run 
  GEXPfx GOVBALfx   GEXPfx GOVBALfx 
GDP 0.95 1.04   0.19 0.18 
CPI 0.75 0.88   1.24 1.31 
            
Total employment 0.75 0.87   0.31 0.30 
Real gross wage 0.86 1.01   0.34 0.32 
            
Government consumption - 0.79   - -0.24 
Government budget -2.42 -   0.76 - 
            
Total energy use (intermediate+final) 1.72 1.77   1.03 1.12 
Energy use in production (total intermediate) 1.41 1.46   0.52 0.56 
Energy consumption (total final demand) 2.44 2.49   1.59 1.70 
Energy intensity (Total energy use/GDP) 0.76 0.72   0.84 0.93 
            
Total imports 2.77 3.11   3.28 3.48 
Total exports 3.63 3.40   2.49 2.39 
 
Focusing on the long run, the binding public sector constraint acts as an additional stimulus in 
the case of the export demand shock: the stimulus to exports increases income tax revenues 
which are recycled to increase government current expenditure. The magnitude of the impact 
of the export stimulus is enhanced compared to the case where Government consumption is 
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fixed. However, the sectoral profile of government expenditure tends to favour comparatively 
non-traded items e.g. Health, education & defence. We also observe a corresponding increase 
in prices due to the increase in demand.  
As such, competitiveness effects are increased and exports increase by 3.4% as compared to 
3.63% in the case where Government consumption is fixed: the additional government 
spending partially crowds out exports. Although we seek to explore the consequences of fiscal 
policy changes on energy policy goals both at a national and regional level in more detail in a 
separate paper, it is evident that Government budget decisions have impacts on energy policy 
goals. Here energy intensity decrease along with the introduction of the public sector 
constraint, for example, reflecting the comparatively low energy intensity of public as 
compared to private consumption. 
  
The wider impacts of energy policy on the macro-economy are increasingly recognised in 
academic and policy discussions around the appropriate use of energy policy. For example, 
recent analyses on energy efficiency policies emphasise the stimulus to economic activity that 
these typically generate and their potentially beneficial impacts on distributional issues. 
However, the potential impact of economic policies on the energy system have been neglected 
and, in particular there has been no system-wide analysis of the spillover effects from 
economic policies to the energy system (Cox et al., 2016). Neglect of such spillovers in the 
conduct of policy may lead to inefficiencies and undetected conflicts (or complementarities) 
among energy and economic policy goals. This could be avoided by a more holistic perspective.  
We begin by analysing the potential impacts of a successful UK Industrial, business and 
innovation policy on the UK. In this paper, we analyse the system-wide effects of successful 
export promotion policies on the energy system. However, since the energy system impacts of 
such policies are, in large part, transmitted via their impact on the economic system, it is 
necessary to adopt an approach that fully captures such interdependence. We do so by 
employing a UK computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, UK-ENVI to analyse the impact 
of a successful stimulus to exports on the economy and energy sub-systems. 
At one level the results of our analysis may be regarded as re-assuring from the perspective of 
successful UK export promotion policies in that all the major indicators of UK economic activity, 
including GDP, employment, consumption and investment are typically significantly 
stimulated. So the major objectives of UK industrial policy are positively impacted by export 
promotion. 
However, there are significant, and typically negative spillover effects to the energy system. 
Most notably, UK exports are, on average, energy intensive, so that export-driven expansion is 
associated with a greater stimulus to total energy use than to GDP: the energy intensity of 
economic activity increases as a result. Furthermore, while not modelled here explicitly, this 
result could translate into increased CO2 emissions if action is not taken at the same time to 
decarbonise the economy in line with the Industrial Strategy challenge on Clean Growth. 
General, across-the-board, export-driven growth is typically not green in nature. However, it 
may be possible to target such policies at specific sectors so as to stimulate green growth.  
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Although we do not attempt to investigate the impacts on precise measures of fuel poverty (or 
poverty in general) we can identify the impact on the share of households disposable income 
spent on energy and non-energy goods across income quintiles. Our results suggest that the 
proportion of the lowest household income groups spending on energy increases so on that 
basis fuel poverty deteriorates. On the other hand, however, that groups total income and 
total expenditure on all goods also increase. Other goals of energy policy are similarly adversely 
affected: affordability (as indicated by the price of energy) declines, although real incomes are 
actually increasing by more than energy prices so that there is a sense in which real 
affordability is improved.  
Energy security is a complex issue with a wide range of indicators (e.g. UK Energy Research 
Centre, 2018). Here we report that the imported energy to GDP ratio increases. Some would 
interpret this as a deterioration in security of supply, although that is controversial and imports 
can and have been used to augment security (e.g. during the miners strike). Given this we 
conclude that the impact of export promotion on security of supply is ambiguous (and will vary 
depending on the source of imports, the routes used to transport them and the mix of sources 
and fuels). Fuel poverty and affordability indicators noted above can also be included within 
the energy security framework. 
Overall, it is very clear that while successful export growth strategies are likely to have the 
desired effect on the economy and the stated goals of industrial policy, they could have 
significant negative spillover effects on the energy system and energy policy goals. Neglecting 
these spillover effects creates a source of inefficiency in the conduct of effects, and a 
knowledge of their likely scale, could be used to develop a more holistic, coordinated approach 
to policy formation and implementation. For example, pursuit of the Clean Growth Strategy 
could mitigate/offset any increase in emissions that would otherwise result from an export 
promotion policy. This would minimise the prospect of conflicts between UK industrial and 
green growth strategies. 
Future research should extend this analysis in a number of directions. First, there is the issue 
of whether other industrial policies have similar impacts on the economy and energy sub-
systems. In particular, we shall explore the likely impact of improvements in productivity; 
another major element of the UK Governments Industrial Strategy. Second, there is the 
question of whether sectorally-targeted export promotion policies can mitigate the negative 
spillover effects of export led stimuli, but currently only be by chance that a targeted sector 
was less energy-intensive than average (since this is not a criterion for targeting). Third, a 
similar sectorally-targeted analysis should be conducted for productivity growth. Fourth, if the 
potential gains from coordination of economic and energy policies are to be identified, it is 
necessary to explore the energy and economy-wide consequences of policies aimed at 
improving both domestic and industrial energy policy, within a common modelling framework. 
Ultimately, the framework that we have developed will allow an exploration of the kinds of 
policy packages that are most likely to facilitate the simultaneous achievement of economic 
and energy policy goals. This is likely to prove particularly challenging in the context of Brexit.10 
                                                                
10 The likely impacts of Brexit are critically dependent on the precise form of Brexit. See e.g. Dhingra et al (2016), Figus et al 
(2018b). 
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-  
  
ܲܯ௜,௧ = ܲܯതതതതത௜ (A.1)  
ܲܧ௜,௧ = ܲܧതതതത௜ (A.2)  
ܲܳ௜,௧ = ܴܲ௜,௧ ή ܴ௜,௧ + ܲܯ௜,௧ ή ܯ௜,௧ܴ௜,௧ + ܯ௜,௧  (A.3)  
ܲܫ ௝ܴ,௧ = σ ܸܴ௜,௝,௧௜ ή ܲ ௝ܴ,௧ + σ ܸܫ௜,௝,௧௜ ή ܲܫതതത௝σ ܸܫܴ௜,௝,௧௜  (A.4)  
ܲ ௝ܻ,௧ ή ௝ܽ௒ = ൭ܲ ௝ܴ,௧ ή ൫1 െ ܾݐܽݔ௝ െ ݏݑ ௝ܾ െ ݀݁݌௝൯ െ෍ܽ௜,௝௏ ܲܳ௝,௧௜ ൱ (A.5)  
ܷܥܭ௧ = ܲ݇௧ ή (ݎ + ߜ) (A.6)  
ܲܿ௧ଵିఙ೎ = ෍ߜ௝௙௝ ή ܲܳ௝,௧ଵିఙ೎ (A.7)  
ܲ݃௧ଵିఙ೒ = ෍ߜ௝௚௝ ή ܲܳ௝,௧ଵିఙ೒ (A.8)  
ܲܰܧ௧ = σ ܲܳ௭,௧ ή തܸ௭௭σ ܲܳ௭ ή തܸ௭௭  (A.9)  
ܲܧ௧ = σ ܲܳா,௧ ή തܸாாσ ܲܳா ή തܸாா  (A.10) 
ݓ௧௕ = ݓ௧(1 + ߬௧) (A.11) 
݈݊ ቆ ݓ௧௕ܿ݌݅௧ቇ = ܾ െ 0.068 ݈݊(ݑ௧) + 0.4 ݈݊ ቆ ݓ௧ିଵ௕ܿ݌݅௧ିଵቇ (A.12) 
ݎ ௝݇,௧ = ܲ ௝ܻ,௧ ή ߜ௝௞ ή ܣ௒దೕ ή ቆ ௝ܻ,௧ܭ௝,௧ቇଵିదೕ  (A.13)  
ܲ݇௧ = σ ܲܳ௝,௧ ή σ ܭܯ௜,௝௜௝ σ σ ܭܯ௜,௝௝௜  (A.14)  
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௜ܺ,௧ = ܣ௜௑ ή ቂߜ௜௒ ή ௜ܻ,௧ఘ೔೉ + ൫1 െ ߜ௜௏൯ ή ௜ܸ,௧ఘ೔೉ቃ ଵఘ೔೉  (A.15)  
௝ܻ,௧ = ቆܣ௑ఘೕ೉ ή ߜ௝௒ ή ܲܳ௝,௧ܲ ௝ܻ,௧ ቇ ଵଵିఘೕ೉ ή ௝ܺ,௧  (A.16)  
௝ܸ,௧ = ቆܣ௑ఘೕ೉൫1 െ ߜ௝௏൯ ή ܲܳ௝,௧ܲݒ௝,௧ቇ ଵଵିఘೕ೉ ή ௝ܺ,௧ (A.17)  
௝ܸ,௧ = ܣ௏ ή ቂߜ௜௏ ή ܧ௜,௧ఘ೔ೇ + ൫1 െ ߜ௜௏൯ ή ܰܧ௜,௧ఘ೔ೇቃ ଵఘ೔ೇ (A.18)  
ܧ௝,௧ܰܧ௝,௧ = ቈቆ ߜ௝௏(1 െ ߜ௝௏)ቇ ή ൬ܲܰܧ௧ܲܧ௧ ൰቉ ଵଵିఘ೔ೇ (A.19)  
ܸ ௭ܸ,௝,௧ = ቆܣ௭ఘೕ೥൫1 െ ߜ௝ாே൯ ή ܲܰܧ௧ܲܳ௭,௧ቇ ଵଵିఘೕೋ ή ܰܧ௝,௧  (A.20)  
ܸ ாܸ,௝,௧ = ቆܣாఘೕಶ൫ߜ௝ாே൯ ή ܲܧ௧ܲܳா,௧ቇ ଵଵିఘೕಶ ή ܧ௝,௧ (A.21)  
௜ܻ,௧ = ܣ௒ ή ቂߜ௜௞ ή ܭ௜,௧ఘ೔ೊ + ߜ௜௟ ή ܮ௜,௧ఘ೔ೊቃ ଵఘ೔ೊ  (A.22)  
ܮ௝,௧ = ൬ܣ௒ఘೕೊ ή ߜ௝௟ ή ܲ ௝ܻ,௧ݓ௧ ൰ ଵଵିఘೕೊ ή ௝ܻ,௧  (A.23)  
  
ܸ ௜ܸ,௝,௧ = ߛ௜,௝௩௩ ή ቂߜ௜,௝௩௠ܸܯ௜,௧ఘ೔ಲ + ߜ௜,௝௩௜௥ܸܫܴ௜,௧ఘ೔ಲቃ ଵఘ೔ಲ (A.24)  
ܸܯ௜,௝,௧ܸܫܴ௜,௝,௧ = ቈቆߜ௜,௝௩௠ߜ௜,௝௩௜௥ቇ ή ቆܲܫܴ௜,௧ܲܯ௜,௧ ቇ቉ ଵଵିఘ೔ಲ (A.25)  
ܸܫܴ௜,௝,௧ = ߛ௜,௝௩௜௥ ή ቂߜ௜,௝௩௜ܸܫ௜,௧ఘ೔ಲ +  ߜ௜,௝௩௥ܸܴ௜,௧ఘ೔ಲቃ ଵఘ೔ಲ (A.26)  
ܸܴ௜,௝,௧ܸܫ௜,௝,௧ = ቈቆߜ௜,௝௩௥ߜ௜,௝௩௜ቇ ή ቆܲܫ௜,௧ܴܲ௜,௧ቇ቉ ଵଵିఘ೔ಲ (A.27)  
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ܧ௜,௧ = ܧത௜ ή ቆܲܧ௜,௧ܲܳ௜,௧ቇఙ೔ೣ  (A.28)  
 ܴ௜,௧ = ෍ܸܴ௜,௝,௧ + ෍ܳܪܴ௜,௛,௧ + ܸܴܳ௜,௧ + ܳܩܴ௜,௧௛௝  (A.29)  
 
௜ܺ,௧ + ܯ௜,௧ = ෍ܸ ௜ܸ,௝,௧ + ෍ܳܪ௜,௛,௧ + ܳ ௜ܸ,௧ + ܳܩ௜,௧௛௝ + ܧ௜,௧ (A.30)  
  
ܻܪ௧ = (1 െ ߬௧)ܮ௧ௌ(1 െ ݑ௧)ݓ௧ + ܴܶܨ௧ + ȫ௧ (A.31)  
 ܥ௧ = ܻܪ௧ െ ܵ௧ (A.32)  
 ௧ܹ = ܰܨ ௧ܹ + ܨ ௧ܹ  (A.33)  
ܰܨ ௧ܹ(1 + ݎ௧) = ܰܨ ௧ܹାଵ + (1 െ ߬௧)ܮ௧௦ (1 െ ݑ௧)ݓ௧ + ܶݎ ௧݂ (A.34)  
           ܨ ௧ܹ(1 + ݎ௧) = ܨ ௧ܹାଵ + ȫ௧ െ ܵ௧ (A.35)  
ܶݎ ௧݂ = ܲܿ௧ ή  ܶݎ݂തതതതത (A.36)  
ܵ௧ = ݉݌ݏ ή [(1 െ ߬௧)ܮ௧௦ (1 െ ݑ௧)ݓ௧ + ܶݎ ௧݂] (A.37)  
ȫ௧ = ݀௛ ή෍ݎ݇௜,௧ܭ௜,௧௜  (A.38)  
ܥ௧ = ൣߜா(ߛܧܿ௧)ఘ௘ െ (1 െ ߜா)ܰܧܿ௧ఘ௘൧ ଵఘ௘ (A.39)  
ܧܿ௧ = ൤ߛఘ௘  ߜா ή ൬ܲܿ௧ܲܧ௧൰൨ ଵଵିఘ௘ ܥ௧ (A.40)  
ܧܿ௧ = ൣߜ௖௢ܥ ௧ܱఘ೒ െ (1 െ ߜ௖௢)ܧܩ௧ఘ೒൧ ଵఘ೒ (A.41)  
33 
 
ܥܱ௧ܧܩܿ௧ = ቈቆ ߜ௖௢1 െ ߜ௖௢ቇ ή ൬ܲܧܩ௧ܲܥܱ௧൰቉ ଵଵିఘ೒  (A.42)  
ܳܪ௭,௧ = ߜ௭௙ఘ೔೎ ή ቆ ܲܿ௧ܲܳ௭,௧ቇఘ೔೎ ή ܰܧܿ௧ (A.43)  
ܧܩ௧ = ൣߜா௟௘ܧ݈݁௧ఘ೐೗ െ (1 െ ߜ௘௟)ܩܣܵ஼ఘ೐೗൧ ଵఘ೐೗ (A.44)  
ܧ݈݁௧ܩܣܵ௧ = ቈቆ ߜீ஺ௌ1 െ ߜீ஺ௌቇ ή ቆܲܳீ஺ௌ,௧ܲܳா௟௘,௧ ቇ቉ ଵଵିఘ೐೗ (A.45)  
ܳܪ௘௟௘,௧ = ܧܿ௧ (A.46)  
ܳܪீ஺ௌ,௧ = ܩܣܵ௧ (A.47)  
ܳܪ௖௢௔௟,௧ = ܥܮ௧ (A.48)  
ܳܪ௢௜௟,௧ = ܱܫܮ௧ (A.49)  
ܳܪ௜,௧ = ߛ௜௙ ή ቂߜ௜௛௜௥ ή ܳܪܫܴ௜,௧ఘ೔ಲ + ߜ௜௛௠ ή ܳܪܯ௜,௧ఘ೔ಲ ቃ ଵఘ೔ಲ (A.50)  
ܳܪܫܴ௜,௧ܳܪܯ௜,௧ = ቈቆߜ௜௛௜௥ߜ௜௛௠ቇ ή ቆܲܯ௜,௧ܲܫܴ௜,௧ቇ቉ ଵଵିఘ೔ಲ (A.51)  
ܳܪܫܴ௜,௧ = ߛ௜௙௜௥ ή ቂߜ௜௛௥ ή ܳܪܴ௜,௧ఘ೔ಲ + ߜ௜௛௜ ή ܳܪܫ௜,௧ఘ೔ಲ ቃ ଵఘ೔ಲ (A.52)  
ܳܪܴ௜,௧ܳܪܫ௜,௧ = ቈቆߜ௜௛௥ߜ௜௛௜ቇ ή ቆܲܫ௜,௧ܴܲ௜,௧ቇ቉ ଵଵିఘ೔ಲ (A.53)  
  
ܨܦ௧ = ܩ௧ܲ݃௧ + ෍ ܴܶܩௗ௡௚௜௡௦,௧ ήௗ௡௚௜௡௦ ܲܿ௧ െ  ቌ݀௚ ή෍ݎ݇௜,௧ ή ܭ௜,௧௜ + ෍ܫܤ ௜ܶ,௧௜ + ߬௧ ή෍ܮ௝,௧௝ ή ݓ௧   + ܨܧതതതത ή ߝ௧ቍ (A.54)  
ܳܩ௜,௧ = ߜ௜௚ ή ܩ௧  (A.55)  
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ܳܩܴ௜,௧ = ܳܩ௜,௧;  ܳܩܯ௜,௧ = 0 (A.56)  
  
ܳ ௜ܸ,௧ = ෍ܭܯ௜,௝௝ ή ܬ௝,௧  (A.57)  
ܳ ௜ܸ,௧ = ߛ௜௩ ή ቂߜ௜௤௩௠ ή ܸܳܯ௜,௧ఘ೔ಲ + ߜ௜௤௩௜௥ ή ܸܳܫܴ௜,௧ఘ೔ಲ ቃ ଵఘ೔ಲ (A.58)  
ܸܳܯ௜,௧ܸܳܫܴ௜,௧ = ൥൭ߜ௜௤௩௠ߜ௜௤௩௜௥൱ ή ቆܲܫܴ௜,௧ܲܯ௜,௧ቇ൩
ଵଵିఘ೔ಲ
 (A.59)  
ܸܳܫܴ௜,௧ = ߛ௜௩௜௥ ή ቂߜ௜௤௩௜ ή ܸܳܫ௜,௧ఘ೔ಲ + ߜ௜௤௩௥ ή ܸܴܳ௜,௧ఘ೔ಲ ቃ ଵఘ೔ಲ (A.60)  
ܸܴܳ௜,௧ܸܳܫ௜,௧ = ൥൭ߜ௜௤௩௥ߜ௜௤௩௜൱ ή ቆܲܫ௜,௧ܴܲ௜,௧ቇ൩
ଵଵିఘ೔ಲ
 (A.61)  
  
ܫ௜,௧ =  ݒ ή ൫ܭܵ௜,௧כ െܭܵ௜,௧൯ ή ߜܭܵ௜,௧  (A.62) 
ܭܵ௜,௧כ = ቆܣ௒ ఘೕೊ ή ߜ௝௞ ή ܲ ௝ܻ,௧ݎ ௝݇,௧ቇ ଵଵିఘೕೊ ή ௝ܻ,௧ (A.63)  
  
ܭܵ௜,௧ାଵ = (1 െ ߜ) ή ܭܵ௜,௧ + ܫ௜,௧  (A.64) 
ܭ௜,௧ = ܭܵ௜,௧  (A.65) 
ܮܵ௧ ή (1 െ ݑ௧) = ෍ܮ௝,௧௝  (A.66) 
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ܫܤ ௜ܶ,௧ = ܾݐܽݔ௜ ή ௜ܺ,௧ ή ܲܳ௜,௧  (A.67) 
  
ܯ௜,௧ = ෍ܸܫ௜,௝,௧ +௝ ෍ܸܯ௜,௝,௧ +௝ ෍ܳܪܯ௜,௛,௧௛ + ܳܩܯ௜,௧ + ܸܳܫ௜,௧ + ܸܳܯ௜,௧ (A.68) 
ܶܤ௧ = ෍ܯ௜,௧௜ ή ܲܯ௜,௧ െ෍ܧ௜,௧ ή ܲܧ௜,௧௜ + ߝ ή ቌ ෍ ܴܧܯതതതതതതതௗ௡௚௜௡௦ௗ௡௚௜௡௦ + ܨܧതതതതቍ (A.69) 
  
ߜ ή ܭܵ௜,் = ܫ௜,் (A.70) 
ܴ௜,்௞ = ߣ௜,்(ݎ + ߜ) (A.71) 
ܨܦ் = െ ൤ݎ + ൬ܲܿ௧ାଵܲܿ௧ െ 1൰൨ ή ்ܲ݃ ή ܩܦ் (A.72) 
ܶܤ் = െݎ ή ܦ் (A.73) 
ܰܨ ௧ܹݎ = (1 െ ߬௧)ܮ௧௦ (1 െ ݑ௧)ݓ௧ + ܶݎ ௧݂ (A.74) 
                      ܨ ௧ܹ ή ݎ் = ȫ௧ െ ܵ௧ (A.75) 
-  ܭܵ௜,௧ୀଵ = ܭܵ௜,௧ୀ଴ (A.76) 
ܮܵୀଵ = ܮܵ௧ୀ଴ (A.77) 
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i,j   (i=j)                    the set of goods or industries 
ins                                  the set of institutions 
dins (ؿ ݅݊ݏ)           the set of domestic institutions 
dngins (ؿ ݀݅݊ݏ)                                     the set of non-gov institutions 
E (ؿ ݅)    the set of energy sectors {Coal, Ele, Gas and Oil}  
z (ؿ ݅)    the set of non-energy sectors 
 
Prices  ܲ ௜ܻ,௧  value added price ܴܲ௜,௧ regional price ܲܳ௜,௧ output price ܲܫܴ௜,௧  national commodity price (regional + ROI) ܲܫ௜,௧  price of RUK commodities  ݎ݇௜,௧ rate of return to capital ݓ௧ unified nominal wage ݓ௧௕  after tax wage ܲ݇௧ capital good price ܷܥܭ௧ user cost of capital ߣ௜,௧ shadow price of capital ܲܿ௧ aggregate consumption price ܲ݃௧ aggregate price of Government consumption goods ߝ exchange rate [fixed] 
  
Endogenous variables  
௜ܺ,௧ total output ܴ௜,௧  regional supply ܯ௜,௧  total import ܧ௜,௧ total export (interregional + international) 
௜ܻ,௧ value added ܮ௜,௧ labour demand 
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ܭ௜,௧  physical capital demand ܭܵ௜,௧ capital stock ܮܵ௜,௧  labour supply ܸ ௜ܸ,௝,௧  total intermediate inputs in i and j 
௜ܸ,௧ Total intermediate inputs in i  ܸܴ௜,௝,௧ regional intermediate inputs ܸܯ௜,௝,௧ ROW intermediate inputs ܸܫܴ௜,௝,௧  national intermediate inputs (ROW+RUK) ܸܫ௜,௝,௧  ROI intermediate inputs ܩ௜,௧ aggregate government expenditure  ܳܩ௜,௧ total government expenditure by sector i ܳܩܴ௜,௧  regional government expenditure ܳܩܯ௜,௧  government expenditure( ROI+ROW) ܥ௧ aggregated household consumption ܧܿ௧ household consumption of energy ܰܧܿ௧ household consumption of non-energy goods and motive energy ܥܱ௧ household consumption of Coal  ܧܩ௧ household consumption of Electricity and Gas ܧ݈݁௧ household consumption of Electricity  ܩܣܵ௧ household consumption of Gas ܥܮ௧ household consumption of Coal ܳܪ௜,௧ total households consumption in sector i   ܳܪܴ௜,௧ regional consumption in sector i  ܳܪܫܴ௜,௧  regional+RUK consumption in sector i  ܳܪܯ௜,௧ import consumption in sector i  ܳ ௜ܸ,௧ total investment by sector of origin i ܸܴܳ௜,௧  regional investment by sector of origin i ܸܳܯ௜,௧ ROW investment demand ܸܳܫܴ௜,௧ national investment (Regional+RUK) ܸܳܫ௜,௧ ROI investment demand 
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ܫ௝,௧ investment by sector of destination j ܬ௝,௧ investment by destination j with adjustment cost ݑ௧ regional unemployment rate ܴ௜,௧௞  marginal net revenue of capital ܵ௧ domestic non-government saving ܶݎ ௧݂ households net transfer ܴܶܵܨௗ௡௚௜௡௦,ௗ௡௚௜௡௦௣,௧ transfer among dngins ܪܶܣܺ௧ total household tax ܶܤ௧ current account balance 
  
Exogenous variables  ܴܧܯതതതതതതത௧ remittance for dngins ܨܧതതതത௧ remittance for the Government ܩܵܣ ௧ܸ government saving ݎ interest rate 
  
Elasticities  ߪ constant elasticity of marginal utility  ߩ௜௑ elasticity parameter between intermediate inputs and value added ߩ௜௒ elasticity parameter between capital and labour ߩ௜஺ in Armington function ߪ௜௫ of export with respect to term of trade ߪ௜௘ Substitution between energy and non-energy in Household consumption ߪ௜௚ Substitution elasticity between CO and EG in Household consumption ߪ௜௢ Substitution elasticity between Coal and Oil in Household consumption 
  
Parameters  ܽ௜,௝௏  Input-output coefficients for i used in j 
௝ܽ௒ share of value added on production 
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ߜ௝௒,௏ shares in CES output function in sector j ߜ௝௞,௟ shares in value added function in sector j ߜ௜,௝௩௜௥,௩௠,௩௥,௩௜ shares parameters in CES function for intermediate goods ߜ௜,௝௤௩௜௥,௤௩௠,௤௩௥,௤௩௜ shares parameters in CES function for investment goods ߜ௜,௛ா,௖௢,௖௟  shares parameters in CES function for households consumption  ߜ௜,௛௛௥,௛௠ shares parameters in CES function for households consumption  ߜ௜௚௥,௚௠ shares parameters in CES function for government consumption  ߛ௜,௝௩௩,௩௜௥ shift parameter in CES functions for intermediate goods ߛ௜௙  shift parameter in CES function for households consumption goods ߛ௜௚  shift parameter in CES function for government consumption  ܾݐܽݔ௜ rate of business tax ܭܯ௜,௝ physical capital matrix ݉݌ݏ rate of saving in institutions dngins ߬ rate of income tax ߩ pure rate of consumer time preference 
bb rate of distortion or incentive to investment ߜ rate of depreciation ߛ efficiency shock in household consumption 
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1.AGR Agriculture, forestry & fishing   47 3 17 31 -9 14   54 32 0 4 0 10 
2. MIN Mining & quarrying   47 17 28 7 5 13   97 30 0 0 -36 8 
3. CRU Crude Petroleum + Natural Gas & Metal Ores + coal   26 12 7 61 1 5   46 4 0 1 -1 49 
4. OMI Other Mining & mining services   33 9 17 36 2 11   54 7 1 1 0 37 
5. FOO Food (+ Tobacco)   57 3 23 5 1 15   50 35 1 0 0 14 
6. DRI Drink   57 4 17 15 2 8   50 22 0 0 1 27 
7. TEX Textile, Leather & Wood   35 2 28 10 1 26   55 13 1 4 0 28 
8. PAP Paper & Printing   37 5 28 11 2 23   70 15 1 3 0 10 
9. COK Coke & refined petroleum products              21 15 10 3 5 62   34 25 0 0 0 41 
10. CHE Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals   34 3 17 17 1 30   28 3 0 1 0 68 
11. RUB Rubber, Cement, + Glass   37 6 28 7 2 26   73 2 0 1 1 24 
12. IRO Iron, steel + metal   37 3 27 6 2 29   64 2 0 5 3 26 
13. ELM Electrical Manufacturing   40 2 30 10 1 20   36 4 0 11 1 48 
14. MOT Manufacture of Motor Vehicles, Trailers & Semi-Trailers     53 1 18 5 1 23   24 13 0 2 1 60 
15. TRA Transport equipment + other Manufacturing (incl Repair)   47 2 27 7 1 18   40 8 1 9 0 43 
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Appendix B continued: 
 
16. ELE Electricity, transmission & distribution   67 53 6 11 2 14   67 30 1 1 0 2 
17. GAS Gas; distribution of gaseous fuels through mains; steam & air conditioning      57 45 10 12 3 18   56 44 0 0 0 0 
18. WTR Natural water treatment & supply services; sewerage services   29 4 20 43 5 2   31 69 0 0 0 0 
19.WAM Water Management & remediation   50 1 21 16 6 7   38 13 25 2 0 22 
20. CON Construction - Buildings   49 1 22 19 3 7   47 1 0 52 -1 1 
21.WHO Wholesale & Retail Trade   39 2 35 15 4 7   24 57 1 3 0 16 
22. TRL Land Transport   43 3 35 12 2 8   53 40 1 1 0 4 
23. TRO Other transport   46 2 23 9 3 19   12 53 0 0 0 34 
24. TRS Transport support   52 1 33 7 3 5   86 4 1 0 0 9 
25. ACC Accommodation & Food Service Activities   35 1 32 12 8 13   13 72 1 2 0 12 
26. COM Communication   32 1 35 20 2 12   50 25 2 11 0 12 
27. SER Services   35 1 23 33 2 6   45 37 0 3 0 16 
28. EDU Education health & defence   29 1 49 6 5 11   16 14 68 1 0 1 
29. REC Recreational   35 1 28 24 5 8   28 50 5 4 0 14 
30. OTR Other private services   22 1 47 21 4 6   37 43 4 8 0 8 
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1. AGR 1.18 0.62 0.88 1.05 2.49 3.71 1.15 1.15 1.17 1.23 
2. MIN 1.22 0.70 0.95 1.00 5.73 3.54 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.30 
3. CRU 2.42 0.45 2.07 2.31 2.69 4.06 2.34 2.34 1.20 2.42 
4. OMI 2.42 0.63 2.12 2.31 3.30 3.69 2.40 2.40 1.18 2.48 
5. FOO 1.21 0.65 0.92 0.97 2.51 3.64 1.19 1.19 1.15 1.27 
6. DRI 1.60 0.59 1.29 1.41 2.29 3.78 1.56 1.56 1.16 1.64 
7. TEX 1.65 0.65 1.36 1.43 2.87 3.65 1.63 1.63 1.18 1.71 
8. PAP 0.95 0.64 0.66 0.74 2.41 3.67 0.93 0.93 1.18 1.01 
9. COK 2.36 0.32 1.96 2.03 2.80 4.33 2.24 2.24 1.27 2.32 
10. CHE 3.10 0.48 2.75 2.89 3.19 4.00 3.03 3.03 1.21 3.11 
11. RUB 1.56 0.65 1.27 1.32 2.82 3.66 1.54 1.54 1.17 1.62 
12. IRO 1.90 0.55 1.58 1.62 2.94 3.85 1.85 1.85 1.19 1.93 
13. ELM 2.36 0.64 2.07 2.14 3.08 3.66 2.35 2.35 1.18 2.43 
14. MOT 2.89 0.56 2.57 2.62 3.38 3.84 2.84 2.84 1.22 2.92 
15. TRA 2.15 0.64 1.86 1.91 2.87 3.67 2.13 2.13 1.18 2.22 
16. ELE 1.06 0.43 0.70 0.88 2.27 4.10 0.98 0.98 1.31 1.06 
17. GAS 1.03 0.46 0.68 0.83 2.46 4.05 0.96 0.96 1.31 1.04 
18. WTR 0.81 0.66 0.53 0.71 2.48 3.62 0.80 0.80 1.13 0.88 
19. WAM 1.11 0.75 0.85 0.96 2.54 3.44 1.12 1.12 1.11 1.20 
20. CON 0.92 0.71 0.65 0.78 2.67 3.53 0.92 0.92 1.12 1.00 
21. WHO 1.27 0.77 1.02 1.10 3.01 3.39 1.29 1.29 1.15 1.37 
22. TRL 0.90 0.79 0.65 0.72 2.81 3.36 0.93 0.93 1.16 1.01 
23. TRO 1.78 0.71 1.51 1.58 3.18 3.52 1.78 1.78 1.19 1.87 
24. TRS 1.10 0.82 0.86 0.90 2.93 3.31 1.13 1.13 1.17 1.21 
25. ACC 1.11 0.77 0.85 0.93 2.96 3.40 1.13 1.13 1.17 1.21 
26. COM 1.08 0.78 0.83 0.93 2.80 3.38 1.10 1.10 1.16 1.18 
27. SER 1.29 0.71 1.02 1.18 2.66 3.52 1.29 1.29 1.15 1.37 
28. EDU 0.10 1.09 -0.05 -0.02 2.81 2.75 0.22 0.22 1.10 0.30 
29. REC 1.15 0.76 0.89 1.02 2.76 3.43 1.17 1.17 1.16 1.25 
30. OTR 0.88 0.87 0.66 0.75 2.88 3.19 0.94 0.94 1.14 1.01 
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  Long-run   Short-run 
   ʍс ? ? ?  ʍс ?  ʍс ? ? ?    ʍс ? ? ?  ʍс ?  ʍс ? ? ?
GDP 1.01 0.95 0.90   0.21 0.19 0.17 
CPI 0.80 0.75 0.70   1.35 1.24 1.15 
                
Unemployment rate (pp difference) -0.75 -0.71 -0.67   -0.32 -0.29 -0.27 
Total employment 0.80 0.75 0.71   0.34 0.31 0.29 
Nominal gross wage 1.72 1.61 1.52   1.72 1.58 1.46 
Real gross wage 0.92 0.86 0.81   0.37 0.34 0.31 
                
Households wealth 1.13 1.06 1.00   0.60 0.55 0.51 
Households consumption 1.23 1.16 1.09   0.78 0.75 0.73 
Labour income 2.53 2.38 2.24   2.07 1.90 1.75 
Capital income 2.11 1.99 1.88   3.08 2.83 2.61 
                
Government budget -2.56 -2.42 -2.29   0.86 0.76 0.69 
Investment 1.35 1.28 1.21   2.05 2.01 1.96 
                
Total energy use (intermediate+final) 1.79 1.72 1.66   1.06 1.03 1.00 
  - Electricity 1.36 1.26 1.18   0.88 0.81 0.75 
  - Gas 1.44 1.35 1.27   0.74 0.70 0.66 
Energy use in production (total intermediate) 1.51 1.41 1.33   0.58 0.52 0.47 
Energy consumption (total final demand) 2.47 2.44 2.42   1.53 1.59 1.65 
  - Households 1.38 1.30 1.22   0.94 0.92 0.89 
  - Investment 1.35 1.26 1.17   1.54 1.40 1.28 
  - Exports 4.04 4.11 4.16   2.35 2.55 2.73 
Energy output prices 0.53 0.50 0.47   1.16 1.06 0.97 
Energy output 1.74 1.65 1.56   0.53 0.47 0.41 
Non energy output 1.19 1.13 1.07   0.52 0.48 0.45 
Energy intensity (Total energy use/GDP) 0.77 0.76 0.75   0.85 0.84 0.82 
                
Total imports 2.66 2.77 2.86   3.06 3.28 3.45 
Total exports 3.54 3.63 3.71   2.29 2.49 2.66 
Net exports (exports-imports) -0.04 -0.04 -0.03   0.09 0.09 0.09 
  - Electricity 2.23 2.27 2.30   2.29 2.41 2.48 
  - Gas 2.43 2.46 2.49   2.61 2.70 2.77 
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-
 
  Long-run   Short-run 
  FRW-FNW BRW ELS   FNW FRW BRW ELS 
GDP 3.28 1.04 0.23   0.85 0.35 0.18 - 
CPI - 0.88 1.20   1.18 1.37 1.31 1.33 
                  
Unemployment rate (pp difference) -3.09 -0.82 -   -1.31 -0.54 -0.28 - 
Total employment 3.29 0.87 -   1.39 0.58 0.30 - 
Nominal gross wage - 1.89 2.59   - 1.37 1.64 2.06 
Real gross wage - 1.01 1.38   -1.16 - 0.32 0.72 
                  
Households wealth 2.25 1.21 0.84   0.57 0.60 0.55 0.54 
Households consumption 2.37 1.31 0.94   1.39 1.22 0.96 0.83 
Labour income 3.29 2.78 2.59   1.40 1.96 1.94 2.06 
Capital income 3.28 2.14 1.73   4.89 3.66 2.99 2.45 
                  
Government consumption 3.42 0.79 -0.16   0.35 -0.11 -0.24 -0.39 
Government budget - - -   - - - - 
Investment 3.28 1.31 0.61   4.51 3.25 2.19 1.44 
                  
Total energy use (intermediate+final) 3.31 1.77 1.22   1.70 1.35 1.12 0.94 
  - Electricity 2.99 1.35 0.76   1.74 1.27 0.92 0.69 
  - Gas 2.90 1.45 0.94   1.23 0.98 0.80 0.67 
Energy use in production (total intermediate) 3.26 1.46 0.81   1.03 0.71 0.56 0.42 
Energy consumption (total final demand) 3.26 1.46 0.94   1.89 1.82 1.70 1.64 
  - Households 2.32 1.48 1.18   1.45 1.37 1.13 1.03 
  - Investment 3.16 1.29 0.62   3.25 2.30 1.61 1.10 
  - Exports 5.00 3.96 3.58   2.47 2.44 2.50 2.52 
Energy output prices - 0.58 0.80   1.06 1.13 1.10 1.10 
Energy output 3.36 1.65 1.04   0.84 0.62 0.51 0.42 
Non energy output 3.31 1.23 0.48   1.16 0.68 0.49 0.30 
Energy intensity (Total energy use/GDP) 0.02 0.72 0.98   0.95 0.99 0.93 - 
                  
Total imports 3.14 3.11 3.11   4.03 3.91 3.48 3.28 
Total exports 5.00 3.40 2.83   2.61 2.29 2.39 2.35 
Net exports (exports-imports) -0.10 0.01 0.05   0.14 0.16 0.11 0.10 
  - Electricity 3.11 2.50 2.28   3.18 2.90 2.57 2.39 
  - Gas 3.17 2.70 2.53   3.44 3.20 2.88 2.71 
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